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O n 17 December 1997, the President of the International Commission of Jurists, Justice Michael Kirby, gave a lecture on Australian experiences of 
freedom of information in which he warned against seven 
deadly sins which can undermine a commitment to freedom of 
information. I will list them as he gave them and ask you to keep 
them in mind as I report to you the state of the Freedom of 
Information Bill as it approaches the half-way stage in its 
passage through Parliament.
Justice Kirby's seven deadly sins were:
1. Strangled at birth
'Do not underestimate the danger ojyour freedom of information 
proposals. Many a White Paper has come to nothing or emerged into 
final legislative form a pale shadow of its former self.
The longer the delay in the passage of the long-heralded UK 
Freedom of Information Bill the greater the risk that Sir Humphrey will 
have the last laugh vet again.'
2. Retaining secrets
'Pretend to support freedom of information but provide so many 
exceptions and derogations from the principle as to endanger the 
achievement of a real cultural change in public administration.'
3. Exemptions
The third deadly sin is 'surrendering too many requests for 
exemptions.'
4. Costs and fees
'Rendering access to freedom of information so expensive that it is 
effectively put beyond the reach of ordinary citizens.'
5. Decision-makers
'Undermining the essential access to an independent decision maker.'
6. Interpretation
For this 'the judiciary and not the politicians, may be 
answerable'. But remember 'judges also grew up in the world of 
official secrets and bureaucratic elitism.'
7. Changing administrative culture
Beware believing that 'the passage of freedom of information 
legislation is enough of itself to work the necessary revolution in 
the culture and attitudes of public administration.'
Mr Chairman, please remember those warnings were given 
over two years ago after the Labour Government had been in 
power less than six months. It could have been given tonight 
after 1000 days of New Labour, so apposite are his warnings. 
But let us begin at the beginning.
When the Labour Partv won its landslide victory in Mav 1997 
most political observers expected that at long last a quarter- 
century-old pledge to introduce a Freedom of Information Act 
would quickly be redeemed. After all the pledge had been in 
every Labour electoral manifesto since 1974. It had been a key 
element in the pre-election Constitutional Committee Report 
drawn up by the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats and 
chaired jointly by Robin Cook and Robert Maclennan. That 
report committed both parties to a range of constitutional 
reforms aimed at reinvigorating the political process.
Indeed it is worth remembering that the raison d'etre for the 
Cook/Maclennan Committee was a shared analysis by Labour 
and the Liberal Democrats that our democracy was in danger 
because of public disenchantment with politics and politicians.
How to re-connect the voters with governance was the task 
we set ourselves. Our solution was a range of proposals to make 
government more open, more relevant and take it closer to the 
people.
As a member of the Cook/Maclennan Commission I can look 
back on the thousand days of the Blair Government with some 
satisfaction. Many of our key proposals have become law with 
commendable alacrity:
  Scotland has its Parliament and Wales and Northern Ireland 
their Assemblies;
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* the European Convention on Human Rights is now part of 
our domestic law;
* elections to the European Parliament and in Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland have all taken place under systems 
reflecting proportionality rather than 'first past the post';
» London will, in May, have a strategic authority, again elected 
by a system reflecting proportionality and a mayor of its o\vn;
* other major cities and local authorities are being encouraged 
to initiate a range of experiments in how we vote and how we 
govern ourselves at local level;
* the first stage of House of Lords reform, removing all but a
o o
hundred hereditary peers, has been carried through;
* the House of Commons has adopted a number of minor 
reforms aimed at making its work more effective.
o
That does not mean that we are in a position to tick the box 
marked constitutional reform and assume that the job is done. 
For one thing, the Liberal Democrats at least would like to see 
public opinion tested in a referendum on proposals for 
introducing systems of PR into voting for both Westminster and 
for local government. Indeed it is ironic that the government 
has conceded PR for the largest local authority, London, yet digs 
its heels in against reform at the level of government where 'first 
past the post' elections have created a string of one-parry states 
and \vith them the associated corruption. There have been too 
manv cases of Labour's 'rotten boroughs' not to see the case for
v O
PR at local government level as overwhelming.
But the other reason why the box marked constitutional 
reform cannot be ticked is because freedom of information, 
which was seen as the cement that bound together all the other 
reforms, remains in doubt. What is more, we are told on goodo
authority that Mr Alistair Campbell can only describe priority 
given to constitutional reform in terms of obscene expletives. 
Even Mr Blair has, apparently, cooled to freedom of information 
on the advice of his old friend Bill Clinton, who has found 
freedom of information American-style something of a burden.
So where are we now on freedom of information? The Bill, 
which was introduced, somewhat belatedly for a 2 5-year-old 
commitment, into this session of Parliament has just completed its 
Committee Stage in the House of Commons. The Bill thus far has 
had a rather worrying ancestry Immediately after the General 
Election the responsibility for freedom of information was put in 
the hands of the Cabinet Office and the Chancellor of the Duchv 
of Lancaster, David Clark. He produced a consultation document, 
'Tibur Right to Know', which was widely acclaimed by all those who 
had campaigned for a Freedom of Information Act as a principled 
and progressive approach to the task at hand. Indeed so principled 
and progressive was Clark's approach that he was promptly sacked 
from the Cabinet, and responsibility for freedom of information 
was transferred to the Home Office. Now it might have been a 
little unworthy of me to suggest, as I did at the time, that putting 
the present Home Secretary in charge of freedom of information 
was like asking Count Dracula to look after a blood bank.
Nevertheless the decision to move freedom of information 
from the Cabinet Office to the Home Office was strange in anv 
circumstances. At a stroke the task was moved from an office 
with general oversight over Whitehall and a specialist minister to 
one of the most overworked and accident-prone departments in 
the government. The suspicion from the very beginning was that
Jack Straw's brief was to recapture the ground which David 
Clark's White Paper had given away. It is an interesting 'Catch 
22' that, although we know what the various political parties, 
interest groups and pressure groups have to say about freedom 
of information, we have no idea what advice has been given by 
the mandarins of Whitehall.
All that we know is that between the departure of Clark and 
the publication of Straw's own discussion document, and the 
draft Bill in the spring of 1999, the government did a quick U- 
turn on the road to Damascus. Instead of being the flagship bill 
of New Labour's commitment to open up government, it took 
on more and more the appearance of a damage-limitation 
exercise. Tfet the Bill now before Parliament is not totally absent 
of all merit. It recognises for the first time a statutory right to 
information in place of the previous effective presumption in 
favour of secrecy. Indeed it was to breakdown what many 
acknowledge as a culture of secrecy not only in Whitehall but 
throughout British Government at all levels which was one of
o
the key motivating forces behind reform. The public cannot 
enjoy their rull rights, nor can elected representatives bring the 
executive and the bureaucracy to full account, \vithout a right to 
know the information on which decisions are based.
The Bill also extended coverage of public authorities far 
further than any previous non-statutory codes or guidelines. 
The wide application of the Bill to central and local government 
activities and public authorities is a major step forward. After all 
it is not by selling arms to Iraq that most citizens come in 
contact with government. It is often the petty injustices and the 
high-handedness of the minor bureaucrat which outrage and 
alienate Mr and Mrs Joe Public.
Nevertheless, following the high expectations raised by the 
Clark White Paper, the Bill as it stands is a major 
disappointment. Clark's proposals outlined just seven specified 
interests such as defence, international relations or policy 
development that required some degree of protection from total 
openness. However, it explicitly repudiated the approach of 
exempting whole categories of information. It argued instead 
that disclosure should be considered on a contents basis and, in 
the main, only refused when 'substantial harm' would be caused 
to one of the specified interests.
The Bill rejects Clark's minimalist approach to exemptions. 
Instead of the White Paper's seven it now features twenty-three 
and gives the Home Secretary power to create still more by order. 
Furthermore, the commitment to judging each document on a 
content basis is gone. Many exemptions are 'class' exemptions, 
concealing information by category rather than through any 
analysis of whether disclosing it might actually cause any damage 
at all. These exemptions are not subject to any 'prejudice' test and 
disclosure can be withheld even if not harmful. Where the 
government has reduced the 'harm' test from 'substantial harm' 
to 'prejudice' it may bear reiteration of the point that the 'class' 
exemptions are not even subject to this watered-down test.
In addition the fairly stiff hurdle of 'substantial harm', which 
the Clark White Paper proposed and which government had to 
clear to justify withholding information, has been reduced to 
one of 'prejudice', substantially widening the amount of 
information each exemption can conceal.
An example of an objectionable class exemption is that which 
exempts all information that has at any time been gathered in an
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investigation which might have led to a criminal prosecution. 
Campaigners have argued that this could allow the Health and 
Safety Executive to withhold information about a rail disaster. 
The families of those who died on the MzrcAioness could be 
refused information about what happened that night. Finally, a 
family like the Lawrences, trying to find out whether or not the 
police competently investigated the murder of their son, could 
find their way blocked by this exemption. It is worth 
remembering that Recommendation 9 of the Macpherson 
Report into the Stephen Lawrence case proposed that:
v4 freedom o^ Jn/ormafion ylcr jAou/a* <JppA/ K> dA* ure 
AotA operational and" administrative, suAyecf on/y to fAe 'suAsfantia/ 
Aarm ' test Jor witAAo/d"in^ disc/osurc. '
In other words, not only was a 'class exemption' rejected, but 
the report advocated the stiffer prejudice test. As it is, whether 
the case was closed, whether a prosecution was ever brought, 
the fact that information was gathered by a public authority in 
an investigation where a prosecution might have resulted would 
allow the information to be withheld forever.
Two other examples of the breadth of the exemptions which 
feature the 'prejudice* test concern defence and international 
relations. Two journalists have won awards from the Campaign 
for Freedom of Information for their work.
In 1994 a Chinook helicopter crashed in the Mull of Kintyre, 
killing all those on board including several senior officers. The 
pilots were later blamed and accused of gross negligence. Tony 
Collins of Computer W&eA/y has uncovered information suggesting 
that Chinooks elsewhere have been affected by software failure, 
therefore casting doubt on the culpability of the pilots. 
Moreover he revealed that MPs had been misled about the crash. 
Information relating to this might be protected either by the 
class exemption for investigations or by the exemption for 
information which might prejudice defence.
Sticking with defence, freelance journalist Rob Evans, writing 
in Tne Te/earapA, has uncovered evidence that thousands of spare 
parts for Trident have gone missing. Will this kind of exposure 
of gross maladministration still be possible, under the catch-all 
exemption for defence matters?
Evans also exposed the fact that in the very recent past Britain 
was giving free military training to some 53 nations. Such 
information would be very interesting to anyone who wished to 
judge whether or not Britain's foreign policy was truly ethical. 
The exemption for information which might prejudice relations 
between the UK and any state, or the interests of the UK 
abroad, might be used to conceal it.
In their defence, government ministers have argued that the 
great benefit of the Bill is that it will open up government to 
prevent the petty secrecies which cause most irritation and 
provide most cover for incompetence and maladministration. 
This may well be so; but it is the cause ce/eAre which tests the 
merit of a system and which in the past has all too often seen the 
British Establishment diving for cover.c*
Another exemption allows information to be withheld if it 
would 'prejudice the commercial interests of any person'. 
Campaigners have argued that this would allow information 
about an unsafe product to be withheld simply because people 
might stop buying the product.
By far the most objectionable exemption is the class 
exemption relating to all matters involved in policy 
development. Liberal Democrats have argued that a key aim of 
freedom of information should be to open up the process of 
government to public scrutiny and debate. Accordingly, we have 
argued that at the very least all the facts and figures upon which 
a decision is based should be released after a decision is made. 
For example: free post for Mayor of London election campaign; 
government refusal based on 'estimates' of cost from jE.15m to 
f,40m   true cost probably about i2m. This would allow 
individuals and lobbying groups to examine whether or not 
government decisions were based on comprehensive and 
correct data. And this is not asking for the moon. The formero
Cabinet Secretary Lord Butler told the Lord's Select Committee 
of which I was a member that such a separation of fact and 
opinion would be possible. The Republic of Ireland's freedom o/ 
information Arr 1997, s. 20(1), only restricts access to factual 
information, its analysis, or scientific or technical advice where 
considerable prejudice would result. New Zealand's O^ida/ 
information Act 1982, s. 9, has been applied in a similar manner.
During my time in the Lords (and I have now been in the 
Lords longer than my four years in the House of Commons) I 
have served on two ad hoc select committees; one looking at the 
implications for the Civil Service of the Thatcher reforms of the 
1980s and the other at the Home Secretary's proposals for 
freedom of information. Those experiences, along with my own 
time as a special advisor inside Whitehall between 1974 and 
1979, convince me that we need a holistic approach to Civil 
Service reform, reform of Parliament and freedom of 
information.
During the 1980s, with very little reference to Parliament 
and, let it be said, very little interest by Parliamentarians in the 
process, the Thatcher Government carried through reforms in 
public administration and the way public services are organised 
which went well beyond anything which would be described as 
new management techniques.
The most decisive of the Thatcher reforms was privatisation 
  moving vast sectors from public to private ownership and 
vastly reducing the number of civil servants along the way. It may 
be said that Mrs Thatcher's main motivation was cost cutting 
and efficiency. However the revolution was carried on under 
John Major, with the hiving off of Civil Service functions to 
semi-autonomous agencies underpinned by the rights of the 
Citizen's Charter. Contracting out and market testing became 
part of reforms which saw the gradual erosion of a unified and 
career-distinctive Civil Service.
Much of this was with clear intent. Mrs Thatcher did not 
doubt that parts of the Civil Service were a Rolls Royce machine 
provided by Rolls Royce minds. What she doubted was whether 
such Rolls Royce minds were all needed locked-up in an over- 
large public service or would not better be deployed in more 
entrepreneurial activities in the private sector.
The House of Lords Committee on which I sat from 1997 to 
1998 looked at whether the Thatcher/Major reforms had 
destroyed the essential ethos of the British Civil Service   the 
independence of thinking and advice which had marked it out 
for its quality since the Northcote Trevelyan reforms a century 
and a half before. We came to the conclusion that that essential 
ethos had survived the turbulence. We also asked the question
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implicit in a long period of one-party rule, namely whether the 
Civil Service had been so politicised by the 'Is he one of us?' 
approach to preferment as to render it incapable of serving new 
political masters.
That question was answered in 1997 when the change of 
government was achieved with great professionalism and 
seamless service.
Things were not the same however. The new government
O o
brought with it a new breed of political advisors, many of whom 
\iaA spent years \\or\ung \vYrn tVieir ministers as a Sund ot s\iat\o\\ 
civil service. In addition the government established numerous 
task forces to help develop policy, bringing into Whitehall 
powerful and influential figures from the private sector. There 
has been much gnashing of teeth about the specific role of both 
the political advisors and of the task forces.
I believe that the political advisors and policy advisors, given 
proper accountability and limits on their action, can be an 
invaluable source of fresh ideas both in the development and 
explanation of policy. The task forces, meanwhile, arouse 
concern because they may provide a convenient link into 
government decision making for the private sector in a way 
which interlinks too closely with financial and other support for 
the governing party.
To see where New Labour is coming from in their approach 
to the Civil Service it is necessary to go back twenty years to the 
previous Labour Government. In 1982, David, now Lord, 
Lipsey, who had been my colleague in Downing Street when I 
headed the No. 10 Political Office, produced a Fabian pamphlet 
entitled 'Making Government Work' which recorded the 
prevailing mood in the Labour Part) after its 1979 defeat:
Tractica/A' be/ore tAe door o^No. 70 Aad" c/osed" on fAe new incumAent 
an inauesf was underway, ft rapidVy revea/ed" a potential cuJprit. 
careju/A/ worked" out poAcies, tAe account went, Aad* Aeen 
saAofoaed" Ay u conservative (j^ not Conservative) CinV Service. '
To be fair to Da\id he quashed that view of history as a myth; a 
view with which I concur. But that pamphlet did make a number 
of points which are familiar today, twenty year later. He said that 
'Civil Service advice needs to be augmented by alternative sources 
of ideas and analysis'. The pamphlet also stated 'from civil 
servants and ministers alike we want to see a broad and generouso
openness' and, perhaps most crucially of all, it clearly said that the 
difficulties which outsiders face in influencing government ando o
the lack of ministerial involvement in key decisions all result in 
part from 'the obsession with secrecy displayed throughout 
British government.'
If the commitment to open up government to outside 
influence via task forces and political and policy advisers is part 
of a 'never again' determination that a Labour government 
should remain master of its own destiny, so too is the 
commitment to more open government.
That is why I believe that it is the cause of radical and 
reforming government which has most to lose by the passing of 
a weak and ineffective Freedom of Information Act. I have 
already paid tribute to the amount of constitutional reform 
promised by Cook/Maclennan which has already reached the 
statute book. But most of that was carried out by the 
momentum of a government returned to office after eighteeno o
years in opposition. Already we are told that the prime minister
fears the law of unforeseen consequences as his constitutional 
creations refuse to dance to his tune. But those are not 
unforeseen consequences. They are the direct consequences for 
those who want to see power squeezed out of Whitehall and 
back into state, regional and local government. Already we have 
seen in Scotland a consultation document produced by a 
coalition government proposing just the kind of Freedom of 
information bill from which Jack Straw has retreated. The 
Scottish legislation advocates three key elements which we will 
continue to press at Westminster:
( 1 ) facts and figures behind policy decisions should routinely 
be released after a decision is taken;
(2) exemptions should be more narrowly drawn and whenever 
possible the test of 'substantial harm' should be used;
(3) the Information Commissioner should be able to order 
disclosure in the public interest. The Scottish Information 
Commissioner will even be able to order the release of 
information falling within exempted categories, if justified 
in the public interest, subject only to a veto by the Scottish 
Executive.
The Scottish Consultation Document, An Open Scotland', 
uses the term 'substantial prejudice' rather than 'substantial 
harm':
'Our use o^'suAsfantia/ prejudice' is inrend'ed' fo maAe c/ear fAat 
information covered Ay a contents Aased" exemption sAou/d" Ae Jisc/oseJ 
un/ess prejudice caused* tvou/d" Ae rea/, acfua/ and" o^ significant suAstance. '
I suspect the word 'prejudice' is used to dovetail with UK 
legislation, though most campaigners would prefer the word 
'harm'; but neither substantial prejudice nor substantial harm 
are on offer in the Straw Bill.
The Scottish Information Commissioner will have power to 
order disclosure of any information covered by a harm-tested 
exemption. In the case of class exemptions (often remaining to 
be consistent with the UK legislation) the Commissioner's final 
say will be subject only to the collective veto of the Scottish 
Cabinet. Such a collective veto has existed in New Zealand since 
1987, but has not been used. Between 1982 and 1987 New 
Zealand allowed individual ministers to overrule the 
Ombudsman (our Commissioner), as will be the case in 
London. However, that individual veto was used so often that 
they later had to amend their system. New Zealand's experience 
shows that London's proposals do not give the Commissioner 
strong enough powers; Scotland's do.
Broad and general exemptions are less problematic as long as 
their provisions can be overridden by a strong and independently- 
administered public-interest test. Unfortunately, as I have already 
pointed out, the Bill does not offer this. Several of its exemptions 
are not subject to the public interest test at all. Where the test is 
applied, the final say on whether or not information should be 
released does not lie with the Information Commissioner but 
with the minister or public authority involved. This is a clear 
conflict between the personal and public interest.
Two good quotes regarding the power of the Commissioner 
to order disclosure in the public interest come from the two 
select committees which examined the Bill:
u/fimafe decision wAerAer information is exempt Jrom sucA a 
o^ access is mad'e Ay a Government /Minister or puAAc aufAorify
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rather than by an independent arbiter, the law may be regarded as a 
statement of good intentions, but it is not a Freedom oj Information 
Act as that term is internationally understood.' (House ot Lords)
In the Commons the Public Administration Committee said:
'In this crucial sense the Bill continues the present discretionary 
system oj the Code oj Practice   it is "open government" and not 
"Jreedom oj information ".'
The Information Commissioner must have powers similar to 
that ot counterparts in Ireland and New Zealand to order 
disclosure. I know that the Lords Select Committee on which I 
sat were most impressed by the evidence of the Irish 
Commissioner on this matter and a related consequence.The 
Irish Commissioner was under no doubt that his having theo
power to order disclosure made for anticipatory compliance, 
i.e. the bureaucracy knew that the game was up and started to 
act in a more open way rather than to resist disclosure. The Irish 
Commissioner did believe, however, that having inherited the 
culture of secrecy from the British it was also necessary to train 
their bureaucracy in the ways of open government. As Justice 
Kirby warned in his seven deadly sins, disclosure is not just by 
Act of Parliament it is also an attitude ot mind. It would be nice 
to think that the Whitehall Civil Service, government agencies 
and other public bodies were already putting in mechanisms to 
train their staff into the culture of open government, rather than 
combing the Bill like accountants do a finance bill tor
o
exemptions to be exploited.
From what one hears of the government behaviour in the 
Commons committee they have either gone as far as they intend 
to go or are reserving any turther concessions for the Lords.
So let me close by trying to anticipate the reception that the 
Bill will get in the Upper House. First, the good news for those 
who hope that the Lords will be able to extract further 
concessions from the government.
The House of Lords is in no mood to accept lectures from the 
government about us being an undemocratic and un-elected 
second chamber with no mandate to thwart the wishes of the 
elected chamber. We are what this government made us. Our 
powers are the powers which the elected chamber wished upon 
us only last year. In that respect it is a secondary and indirect 
mandate; but a mandate nevertheless. If the government hado
wished the House of Lords to have no power it should have 
brought forward a bill which would have done just that. Instead 
it left us with the powers of a revisory and an advisory chamber. 
If ever there was a bill where we should use those powers, the 
Freedom of Information Bill is it.
The bad news is that although the government cannot get all its 
own way in the Lords in the way it can in the Commons with its 
180 majority, we must not assume that it will be entirely without 
friends. Although the Conservative Opposition have undergone a 
Pauline conversion of their own on freedom of information, their 
back-benches and the cross-benches may not be as solid as we 
might wish on these matters. Ex-ministers tend to remember 
their old love affair with secrecy and there are plenty of retired 
mandarins on the cross-benches ready to defend the old ways.
Nevertheless there will be a concerted effort in the Lords to 
make the government think again so as to open up the 
background to decision making, narrow to an absolute 
minimum areas of exemption, restore the substantial harm
hurdle and beef-up the powers of the Commissioner. We will 
also want to write onto the face of the Bill a 'Purpose Clause' 
which will spell out Parliament's intention for the courts, the 
bureaucracy and the general public. It is interesting to note that 
Elizabeth France, the Data Protection Registrar and Information 
Commissioner Designate, has argued the need for a clear set of 
principles to guide access decisions under the Freedom of 
Information Act.
Section 4 of New Zealand's Act states the purpose of the Act 
as being to 'increase progressively the availability of official 
information to the people of New Zealand'. The clause has been 
useful in helping to ensure that there is usually a presumption in 
favour of disclosure bv the Ombudsman and courts.
Without such an intentions clause, the suspicion will continue 
that this is an exercise in damage limitation and the culture of 
secrecy will remain.
If they really mean it the government must be a cheer-leader 
tor openness. For too long in Britain, the Civil Service and 
government have been co-conspirators in keeping things secret. 
Having few and narrow exemptions and a strong Commissioner 
should both be essential parts of the government demonstrating 
its commitment to treedom ot information. In the absence ot 
either of those, a Purpose Clause is the very least that they can 
offer to bolster the moral authority of the Bill, and increase its 
impact on the culture of secrecy.
Now I am well aware that a Freedom of Information Bill may 
seem to the general public no more than an Anoraks' Charter, 
of interest to Guardian leader writers and the Institute of 
Advanced Legal Studies. I do not believe that. The battle lines
O
which are being drawn as the Bill moves to the House of Lords 
are at the dividing line between what Lord Hailsham described 
as 'elective dictatorship' and accountable, democratic, 
parliamentary government.
In his lecture, Justice Kirby quoted with approval another 
Australian judge, Justice Paul Finn. This Justice Finn quote goes 
to the heart of the matter:
'To the extent that the power oj the people is devolved upon 
institutions and officials under our constitutional arrangements, those 
ojficials and institutions become the trustees   the fiduciaries   of that 
power for the people. The reason is obvious enough. In a fundamental 
sense the power given to ojficials, elected and non-elected alike, is not 
their own. It is ours. They hold it in our sen-ice as our sen-ants. In 
short our officials exist for our benejit.'
Quite so. And that concept of 'service' in governance can only 
be fulfilled on the basis of a freedom of information act which 
both extends the right to know and changes the culture of 
secrecy.
I hope and believe that the Lords will not flinch from its duty 
and will insist that the present Freedom of Information Bill is 
inadequate for the needs of a modern democracy. In truth, the 
existing Code ot Practice is in some respects broader than the 
provisions of the Bill; in particular, in respect of tactual 
information and policy making. What is needed is a 21 st- 
century act for new circumstances.We are moving into the age 
of interactive democracy. A third of our population already has 
access to the Internet, and the government's intention is for a 
vvired-up Britain.
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We are told that already underway is the Knowledge Network 
Project whose overall aim is to use the new technologies to 
explain the government message without going through 'the 
distorting prism of media reporting', according to a Cabinet 
Office paper leaked to The Guardian.
II government is intent on providing such weaponry for its 
own defence, it is essential that Parliament and people have 
increased access to information if the present unequal balances 
ot power between the executive and Parliament and the 
executive and the citizen are not be distorted further.
I referred earlier to the Law of Unforeseen Consequences and 
how it is now tempering the reforming enthusiasm of the Blair 
Government. But I repeat these consequences are not 
unforeseen   they are intentional. We are seeking a range of 
reforms which will diminish and disperse the power ot Britain's 
over-centralised state. We are seeking to empower the citizen 
and to make Parliament stronger and more effective in its check 
on the executive. We are seeking to make decision-making at all 
levels more transparent and more accountable.
All this will make government in terms of the concept of 
British Government as an elected dictatorship more difficult. 
Good, but it will also rescue the government from isolating itself 
behind walls of secrecy, increasingly blaming the media and the 
messengers for not understanding, until a combination of hubris 
and alienation brings them crashing down.
In February 1996, a vear out from his landslide victory, Tony 
Blair said this:
'It is time to sweep away the cobwebs oj secrecy which hang over Jar 
too much government activity.
The traditional culture oj secrecy will only be broken down by giving 
people in the UK the legal right to know.'
When he made that speech it cannot have been his intention 
to provide Britain with one of the world's most timid and 
restrictive freedom of information acts to be enacted by a 
Westminster-style democracy. Yet that is what is heading for the 
Statute Book unless the House of Lords intervenes. There is an 
old saying in the Southern States of the USA:
'It is sometimes difficult to remember that the idea was to drain the 
swamp when you find yourself up to the armpits in alligators.'
Well, all governments very quickly find themselves up to the 
armpits in alligators. It has perhaps taken this one a little longer 
than most.
When the 18th-century radical, John Wilkes, announced that 
he intended to publish a newspaper, The North Briton, he was 
asked, 'How tree is the British Press?' He replied, 'We are about 
to find out.'
Today we can ask how determined is the House of Lords to 
use its .increased legitimacy to reject poor and inadequate 
legislation and to remind the government that the swamp of 
secrecy remains undrained?
The answer is the same: 'We are about to find out.' @
Lord McNally
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